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Abstract:  As Derrida observes, the ideal of a 
perfect memory has a spectral quality. The 
desire to achieve it is like the wish of Hanson, 
the fictional archaeologist, to go beyond the 
physical remains to grasp the past itself. What 
seduces us is the thought that remembering is 
like mechanical reproduction. We forget, how-
ever, that a photograph does not remember 
what we looked like any more than a recording 
remembers the sound of our voice. Only a living 
being can remember. Seen in this light, the 
ultimate problem of the ideal of a perfect 
memory is that it abstracts remembering from 
the context in which it functions. In this paper, 
I argue that this context is that of our embod-
ied being-alive, with all the limitations that this 
implies. Such limitations impose a teleological 
structure on our remembering. They determine 
how memory functions on both an individual 








Resumen: Como observa Derrida, el ideal de 
la memoria perfecta tiene una cualidad espec-
tral. El deseo de conseguirlo es como el de 
Hanson, el arqueólogo ficticio, de querer ir más 
allá de los restos físicos para alcanzar el pasa-
do mismo. Nos seduce la idea de que recordar 
sea como una reproducción mecánica. Olvida-
mos, sin embargo, que una fotografía no re-
cuerda cómo éramos más de lo que una graba-
ción recuerda el sonido de nuestra voz. Sólo un 
ser vivo puede recordar. Desde este punto de 
vista, el problema último del ideal de la memo-
ria perfecta es que abstrae el recordar del 
contexto en el que éste realizaría su función. 
En este artículo argumento que dicho contexto 
es el de nuestro estar-vivos encarnado, con 
todas las limitaciones que ello implica. Estas 
limitaciones imponen una estructura teleológi-
ca en nuestro recordar. Determinan como 










As Derrida observes, the ideal of a perfect memory has a spectral quality. 
The desire to achieve it is like the wish of Hanson, the fictional archaeologist, to 
go beyond the remains to grasp the past itself. Seeing the Gradiva’s footprint in 
Pompey’s ashes, Hanson dreams of grasping  
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the uniqueness of the printer-printed, of the impression and the imprint, of the 
pressure and its trace in the unique instant where they are not yet distinguished 
the one from the other, forming in an instant a single body of Gradiva’s step, of her 
gait, of her pace and of the ground that carries them. (Derrida, 1996: 98-99)  
 
The spectral quality of the ghost that haunts him is, fictionally, that of 
Gradiva herself. He dreams of “bringing [her] back to life”, this by “reliving the 
singular pressure or impression that Gradiva’s step [...] at that time, on that 
date [...] must have left in the ashes” (Derrida, 1996: 98-99). Philosophically, 
the spectral quality refers to a past that is no longer past, a past whose dis-
tance from the present has been erased. The ideal of such a perfect representa-
tion of the past is similar to that of a perfect map, one that would collapse the 
spatial distinction between the representation and the represented. In his one 
paragraph story, “Del rigor en la ciencia” (“On Scientific Rigor”), Borges relates 
how “the art of cartography attained such perfection” that “the cartographers’ 
guilds struck a map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which 
coincided point for point with it”. Such a map, however, proved to be “useless” 
and was later abandoned to the elements. Only tattered ruins remained, “in-
habited by animals and beggars” (Borges, 1999: 325)1.  
In both cases, what is symbolized is the misapplication of scientific rigor. 
Both the archaeologist and the cartographers attempt to close the gap between 
the representation and what it represents. Doing so, they extend their catego-
ries of exactitude and verification to areas that cannot sustain them. What se-
duces us to the ideal of the perfect memory is the thought that remembering is 
like mechanical reproduction. An old photograph of us appears to collapse the 
present and the past as does a recording. We forget, however, that a photo-
graph does not remember what we looked like any more than a recording re-
members the sound of our voice. Only a living being can remember. Seen in 
this light, the ultimate problem of the ideal of a perfect memory is that it ab-
stracts remembering from the context in which it functions. When it does, it 
becomes, like the perfect map, useless for our purposes. Since only living be-
ings remember, memory’s context is that of our embodied being-alive, with all 
 
 
1  This short text can be accessed at 
https://notes.utk.edu/bio/greenberg.nsf/0/f2d03252295e0d0585256e120009adab?OpenDocument. A 
Spanish version is available at http://elmundoenverso.blogspot.com/2007/12/del-rigor-en-la-ciencia-
jorge-lus.html 
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the limitations that this implies. Such limitations impose a teleological structure 
on our remembering. They determine how memory functions on both an indi-





Remembering is always conjoined with forgetting. The first limitation we 
face is that we cannot remember everything. Some things, of course, are easy 
to recall, but others have sunk down and have to be searched for. From a phys-
ical point of view such forgetting presents a mystery. Is it a result of our not 
having enough brain cells? This hardly seems possible given that we have over 
100 billion and untold connections existing between them. Phenomenologically, 
the answer lies in the structure of our consciousness, which always involves a 
foreground-background relation. Because we are embodied perceivers, we al-
ways see the world from a particular point of view. Things close to us form the 
foreground, those further away compose the background. Of course, we can 
move forward to examine the latter, but then they become part of the fore-
ground, with the objects that were once close to us now forming the back-
ground. Given that we can view an object only from one point of view at a time, 
this foreground-background structure characterizes our consciousness of every 
object. Thus, as we walk around a chair, our present perception of it occupies 
the foreground, the other perceptions that we have had or anticipate having 
form the background. Yet, we still assert that each perception we had or will 
have is a perception “of” the object. This “of” designates its intentional relation 
to the perceived object. Phenomenologically, this signifies that we take our pre-
sent perception as a member of a series of perceptions, each of which could 
serve as the foreground view. The intentional relation of a perception to a visi-
ble object is just such membership. As Merleau-Ponty observes, when I assume 
an impersonal third-person perspective and speak of the object in itself, that is, 
the object as it is simultaneously available to all perspectives, I dispense with 
this foreground-background structure2. Doing so, however, I also dispense with 
my perceptual awareness of the object. This is because this foreground-
 
 
2 As Merleau-Ponty expresses this, “Ainsi, la position d’un seul objet au sens plein exige la composition 
de toutes ces expériences en un seul acte polythétique. En cela elle excède l’expérience perceptive et la 
synthèse d’horizons …” (1945: 85). 
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background structure is essential to consciousness in its intending the object. 
To posit an object “absolutely” without this structure is, then, to posit it in the 
absence of consciousness. In fact, as Merleau-Ponty writes, “the absolute posit-
ing of a single object is the death of consciousness” (1945: 85). It is its death 
since consciousness can perceptually relate to its objects only one view at a 
time. Given that our memories have the same structure as the perceptions they 
recall, a similar death would occur if we could remember simultaneously all the 
views of the object. One remembered view always forms the foreground, the 
rest are necessarily relegated to the background. They are not presently held in 
memorial consciousness. This holds not just for the memories of a specific ob-
ject, but also for those of the world in which it is set. Whenever we remember, 
there is a focus, one that brings certain things forward and relegates others to 
the background. 
We can understand the determination of this focus by noting a second limi-
tation of our conscious life. This is the fact that, in regarding the external world, 
we are limited to the present. Outside of us, it is always now. We can neither 
see what is past, which has vanished, nor what is to come, which has yet to 
appear. Thus, at any given moment, we only intuit spatial relations3. As Kant 
expresses this insight, “time cannot be outwardly intuited, any more than space 
can be intuited as something in us” (1955: vol. 3, 52). His point is that to re-
gard time, we must turn inward and consult our memories and anticipations. 
Given this, how do we verify our memories? Since the past has vanished, we 
cannot compare what we remember with what actually occurred through a di-
rect, external perception. The past is available to us only through our memo-
ries, but our question concerns not their presence, but their verification. The 
answer is that we verify them through prediction. Suppose, for example, we 
remember leaving our book in an adjoining room. If we did leave it there, we 
can go there and find it. The memory, in other words, involves an anticipation, 
one that can be verified through an external perception. To see what deter-
mines the focus of our remembering, we need only ask why we want to find the 
book. The ready answer is that we need it for something we plan to do —say, 
to check a reference or to give it to a friend. The book, in other words, is nec-
essary for our project. To take another example, we hunt in the basement for 
 
 
3 In this, we are like a camera, were a camera able to intuit. 
REMEMBERING AND FORGETTING AS A FUNCTION OF LIFE 181 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 181 
 
nails and tools, trying to remember where we put them. We do this because we 
need to hang a picture. As these examples indicate, the focus of our remember-
ing is normally set by what we plan to do. Our goal determines the shape of our 
memories’ foreground-background structure. We remember what is necessary 
to accomplish our project, while all the rest recedes into the background. 
Fundamental to this determination is a third limitation of our being-alive. 
This is the fact that, as embodied, we can be in only one place at a time. As a 
result, we cannot do everything. We cannot, for example, set off in opposite 
directions down the road. We have to choose a destination. The necessity of 
this choice is one with the necessity of making a selection of what we want to 
remember, i.e., of determining the particulars of the foreground-background 
structure of our remembering. In other words, there is a line of determination 
that goes from our embodied finitude, to our having to choose between pro-
jects, to the fact that we selectively remember according to our particular 
goals. All of these determinations pertain to the functioning of our embodied 
being-alive, a functioning that is directed to a future that is grasped in terms of 
our goals. Traumatic memories represent a breakdown of this functioning. They 
constrain us to a time-loop, forcing us to relive a distressing event. They are a 
freezing of our memory’s foreground-background structure. As such, they are a 
sign of the memory’s inability to provide us with what we need to get on with 
our lives. By contrast, the random, associative arising of our memories, as 




2. THE TEMPORALITY OF REMEMBERING 
 
If in normal waking life, remembering is determined by what we want to 
accomplish, then its functioning is essentially teleological. Projects are goal di-
rected activities. As such, they display a unique temporality, one where the fu-
ture in the form of a goal determines the past and, through this, determines 
the present. Thus, suppose a woman decides to become a marathon runner. 
Her being as an actual runner is not a present reality. Neither is it a past one. It 
exists as a future whose determining presence is that of a goal. How long she 
has to train is determined by the resources she brings to the goal —i.e., how 
long she has trained in the recent past. This determines her present level of 
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training. As this example indicates, the goal determines the past by presenting 
it as a resource or material needed for the activity that will realize the intended 
future. In other words, the past appears as a potential that can be actualized 
by our present ongoing activity. Thus, the paper I purchased can appear as pa-
per for writing, drawing, burning, etc. depending on my goal. Given that the 
past is “present” in memory, the same line of determination links memory to 
the future. I remember, for example, the paper I have purchased because I 
need something to write on. Similarly, my goal of becoming a marathon runner 
makes me call to mind how often I have trained. The determination, here, is in 
the form of interpretation. Not only does my intended future make me focus on 
some things, rather than others. It also determines how I focus on them, i.e., 
how I view them as means for my goal. Heidegger expresses this position in its 
broadest possible terms by writing that “Dasein can authentically be past only 
because it is directed to the future. In a certain sense, its having been springs 
from the future” (1967: 326)4. The sense in which the past arises from the fu-
ture is in its being grasped as my potentiality to accomplish this future. Appre-
hended in the light of this future, it becomes my having been in the ontological 
sense of the potentialities that characterize my being. 
The above should not be taken to imply that the past is completely passive 
in the sense that it has no determining role. Its status is not that of an Aristote-
lian pure potentiality. The line of temporal determination, in which the future 
determines the past, which determines the present, can be extended to the 
present’s determining the future. So regarded, it can be considered as forming 




 This determination of the future by the present should not be thought of in 
terms of physical causality. As with the determination of the past by the future, 
 
 
4  “Dasein kann nur eigentlich gewesen sein, sofern es zukünftig ist. Die Gewesenheit entspringt in 
gewisser Weise der Zukunft”. 
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what is determined is interpretation. As Husserl describes this, “the style of the 
past becomes projected into the future” ([1917-18] 2001: 38)5. In other words, 
experiencing, we constantly anticipate. We assume that fresh experience will 
maintain the “style of the past”. Doing so, we project the interpretations that 
informed our past experience. Thus, we interpret a familiar set of shapes and 
motions as the appearances, say, of a cat. Having often been successful at ap-
plying this schema, we use it unconsciously. Suppose, for example, we notice 
what seems to be a cat crouching under a bush on a bright sunny day. As we 
move closer to get a better look, its features seem to become more clearly de-
fined. One part of what we see appears to be its head, another, its body, still 
another its tail. Based upon what we see, we anticipate that further features 
will be revealed as we approach: this shadow will be seen as part of the cat’s 
ear; another will be its eye, and so forth. If our interpretations are correct, then 
our experiences should form a part of an emerging pattern that exhibits these 
features, i.e., that perceptually manifests the object we assume we are seeing. 
If, however, we are mistaken, at some point our experiences will fail to fulfill 
our expectations. What we took to be a cat will dissolve into a flickering collec-
tion of shadows. As this example indicates, to interpret is to anticipate. It is to 
expect, on the basis of past experience, a sequence of contents that will pre-
sent the object. This expectation, even if we are not directly conscious of it, 
makes us attend to some contents rather than others. It serves, in other words, 
as a guide for our connecting our perceptions according to an anticipated pat-
tern. As such, it determines what we see.  
The schema indicated by this example is perfectly general. What makes it 
such is the fact that perception always involves interpretation6. We experience 
this whenever we regard those optical illusions in which alternative figures pre-
sent themselves —for example, the one where first a girl and then an old wom-
an appears. The switch between the two is not caused by the visual data, which 
remain unchanged, but by the way we take the data. The designer of the illu-
 
 
5 “[...] der Stil der Vergangenheit wird in die Zukunft projiziert”. 
6  As Husserl puts this point, “Zur Wahrnehmung gehört, dass etwas in ihr erscheine; aber die 
Interpretation macht aus,  was w i r  Erscheinen nennen, mag sie unrichtig sein oder nicht, mag sie sich 
getreu und adäquat an den Rahmen des unmittelbar Gegebenen halten oder ihn, künftige Wahrnehmung 
gleichsam antizipierend, überschreiten.  Das Haus erscheint mir — wodurch anders, als dass ich die wirklich 
erlebten Sinnesinhalt in gewisser Weise interpretiere. Ich höre einen Leierkasten — die empfundenen Tone 
deute ich eben als Leierkasten-töne. Ebenso nehme ich interpretierend meine psychischen Erscheinungen wahr, 
die “mich” durchschauernde Seligkeit, den Kummer im Herzen usw. Sie heißen  “Erscheinungen”, oder 
besser erscheinende Inhalte, eben als Inhalte der perzeptiver Interpretation  (1992: vol. 4, 762). 
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sion has so constructed it that it supports two separate interpretations. It al-
lows two separate ways of synthesizing or connecting what we see, which we 
learned from our past experience. Interpretation is present in every sort of per-
ception, including those that Pascal attributed to the esprit de finesse —i.e., 
those emotional and social perceptions that allow us to grasp our relations to 
others. Just as we learned to see from infancy onward by learning the patterns 
of perceptions that distinguished objects from their backgrounds, so we also 
learned how to read our own and others’ emotional states. Such learning in-
volves learning how to interpret what we experience and to anticipate accord-
ingly. It also involves all the interpretations involved in our culture, from the 
interpretation of the sounds we hear as spoken language to a grasp of the 
meaning of our country’s political symbols and gestures. Without the memory 
that gives us access to what we have learned, we can neither interpret nor an-
ticipate. But this means that the future is closed off to us. We have no projects 
since our “having been”, in the ontological sense of the potentialities that char-
acterize our being, is no longer available. As the example of Alzheimer’s disease 
exhibits, a complete loss of memory is a complete loss of identity.  
This determination by the past is, of course, not absolute. It is matched by 
the past’s being determined by the future. What we confront here is a double 
determination of interpretation —that of the past by the future and that of the 
future by the past. Because we project it forward, our past determines our in-
terpretation of the future; but equally, in making us regard the past as material 
for our projects, the future determines how we interpret our past. The two are 
thus linked together in the teleological circle drawn above. As for the present, it 
plays the role of actualizing such determinations. Thus, the actualization of the 
potentialities contained in our representations of the past occurs in the present 
—the very same present in which we actualize the expectations that are con-
tained in our representations of the future. The symbolism of the circle should 
not lead us to believe that the mutual determination of the past and the future 
forms a closed loop. The present that mediates between the two is not one 
where every expectation is fulfilled. As the example of intending to the see the 
cat illustrates, anticipations and, hence, interpretations are not always fulfilled. 
The future that we envisage, for example, that of picking up and holding the 
cat, can turn out to be an illusion. In its place, we find only a collection of flick-
ering shadows. In fact, in normal perceptual life, we are constantly readjusting 
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our interpretations and expectations when the data fails to support them. With 
this, our vision of the intended future shifts and the interpretation of the past 
that we base on this undergoes a corresponding change. For example, we ex-
pect a hammer to be in a certain place. We remember placing it and anticipate 
finding it there. But it is not there. The intended future is not made present and 
thus we have to readjust our memories. The same holds for perceptual experi-
ence in general. In the concrete course of our life, as we adjust our interpreta-
tions, what we see and remember have a fluid, shifting identity. As part of this 
life, remembering is not a mechanical recording. It is rather a living functioning. 
It shares life’s ability to respond to its environment, both shaping it and being 
shaped by it. The environment makes its presence felt in the present —i.e., in 
its fulfilling or failing to fulfill our expectations. Responding to it, we adjust our 
interpretations and hence our view both of the future and the corresponding 
potentialities that our past affords us. We do this as we continue to work on our 
environment, shaping it according to a projected future. The teleological tem-




3. COLLECTIVE REMEMBERING 
 
Aristotle writes in his Politics that a single individual “may be compared to 
an isolated piece at draughts” (1253a 5). Apart from the board and the other 
pieces, a single piece has no sense. Similarly, one cannot speak of the concrete 
life of individuals without bringing in the fact of their living together. The neces-
sity to do so comes from the fourth limitation of our being-alive. As embodied, 
we draw our substance from the world. In common with all other organic be-
ings, we live from it. Our limitation, as social animals, is that such living from is 
collective. As a result, we never exist alone. Not only do we require an extend-
ed period of care until we reach maturity, even as adults we require others. As 
Aristotle expresses this, “in the first place, there must be a unity of those who 
cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female” (Ibid. 1252a 27). 
Beyond this, there is the resulting family of children, cousins, uncles, etc. But 
 
 
7 On this point, see Hans Jonas, 1996: 88-96. For an interpretation of Jonas’ account of the teleological 
temporality of living beings, see James Mensch, 2010: 252-254. 
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this is not sufficient to meet our needs. Different families must come together 
to form a village. Such villages, however, also have needs that they cannot fully 
meet, a fact that leads them to coalesce into a larger community, a state, to 
achieve self-sufficiency. As Aristotle expresses this,  
 
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to 
be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the 
bare needs of life and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. (Ibid. 
1252b 27-29) 
 
Thus, given that the “the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing”, 
nor is the family, it follows that “the state is by nature clearly prior to the family 
and to the individual” (Ibid., 1253a 27). The priority, here, is that of function-
ing.  Because our individual functioning presupposes the collective, we can 
speak of an analogous functioning on the collective level. 
This point holds for the teleological temporality of this functioning. We find 
a parallel temporality with the same set of determinations in our collective life. 
Thus, the projects through which a society meets the common needs of its 
members express its apprehension of its future. This apprehension determines 
what it needs to remember to prepare for this future8. Similarly, there is a de-
termination of the future by the past, which the society projects forward to an-
ticipate what is coming. This means that when it cuts itself off from its past, it 
has no basis for anticipating the future. It is continually astonished by the 
events that break upon it. It does not know what to make of them since it lacks 
the appropriate interpretative categories. Lacking an acquaintance with its past, 
a society cannot grasp the resources within it required for its projects. The re-
sult is that its relation to these projects lacks reality. It becomes a form of col-
lective daydreaming, where futures are imagined without a real sense of what it 
would take to achieve them or the consequence that would follow were they 
 
 
8 Pierre Nora sees the present age as marked by the breakdown of this structure.  In his view,  “it was 
the way in which a society, nation, group or family envisaged its future that traditionally determined 
what it needed to remember of the past to prepare that future; and this in turn gave meaning to the 
present, which was merely a link between the two”.  Currently, however, we are experiencing the “ac-
celeration of history,” which “essentially means that the most continuous or permanent feature of the 
modern world is no longer continuity or permanence but change”. As a result, we can no longer envisage 
the future.  Thus, “[w]e do not know what our descendants will need to know about ourselves in order to 
understand their own lives”.  The result is “the end of any kind of teleology of history—the end of a his-
tory whose end is known”. (2002). Nora’s position, in our view, is too extreme. Taken literally, it would 
make collective action impossible. 
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realized. In the concrete temporality of society, we thus have a mutual deter-
mination. Without the future, in the form of collective projects, there is no focus 
to remembering. Without the past, we have no categories for grasping the fu-
ture. As on the individual level, the past we collectively remember though our 
myths, stories, histories and monuments, determines our interpretation of the 
future, which, itself, determines the focus of this remembering. 
The medium for this determination is once again the present. It either ful-
fills our collective expectations or disappoints them. According to the evidence 
it affords us, the interpretations that these expectations embody are proved to 
be well-founded or shown to be lacking. In a healthy society, they are revised 
in the light of this evidence. The future that we expect is corrected, and we re-
examine what the past actually offers us. There is, in other words, a constant 
adjustment of anticipation and remembering. The experience of the civil rights 
movement in the United States, for example, led not just to a revision of the 
project of American equality, but also to a reinterpretation of the past. In this, 
different things came to prominence. The South’s secession that brought on the 
Civil War was viewed in terms of its desire to maintain slavery rather than its 
insistence on “states’ rights” as had been previously maintained. Similarly, his-
torians recalled that George Washington’s slaves, prompted by the chance for 
liberation, fought on the side of the British during the Revolutionary War. The 
thrust for liberation, which their actions revealed, became one of the resources 
required for the future envisaged by the civil rights movement.  
Not all societies are equally capable of making such adjustments. A trau-
matic event, such as the battle of Kosovo for the Serbs, can lead to a fixation 
on the past and a consequent misreading of the future, one that ignores the 
evidence of the present9. At the opposite extreme, the reticence of the press to 
report on certain issues can leave a gap in the collective memory, one that can 
turn to astonishment when events suddenly force these issues into the open10. 
There are also the disturbances in our collective temporalization that result 
from the actions of tyrannical regimes. Under Stalin, the Soviet Union regularly 
 
 
9 Slobodan Milošević’s Gazimestan speech, given on June 28, 1989, where he focused on the Battle of 
Kosovo in projecting the future of his country is an example of this. His assertion, “Six centuries later, 
now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles,” proved unhappily prophetic. The 
speech in Serbian and English can be accessed at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Gazimestan_speech. 
10 Thus, the “astonishment” professed over the arrest of Dominique Strauss-Kahn was matched by the 
press’s reticence to report on his sexual affairs. 
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rewrote its history, purging its archives of all reference to fallen public figures. 
The official state histories, public monuments, and state-sponsored commemo-
rations are, in a tyranny, correlated to an officially sanctioned future. They pre-
sent the past as a means for achieving a set of state-approved projects. Here, 
the future as portrayed by the regime, takes the determining role. The past 
assumes a position of pure passivity. The regime, by controlling the press, con-
trols also the evidence that would normally serve to verify the progress towards 
the state-approved future. The result is a closed loop, one where the remem-
bered past and the expected future are frozen in a static relationship. As a re-
sult, the regime becomes increasingly alienated from the actually experienced 
world. Lacking the flexibility of a living temporality, such tyrannies do not 
evolve but rather persist till they suddenly break apart.  
 
 
4. MEMORY VERSUS HISTORY 
 
Regimes display this rigidity when they centralize power and use it to de-
termine a unique future. When, however, power is divided, as in a democracy 
where different political parties through their programs represent different con-
ceptions of the future, both the anticipated future and the remembered past are 
matters of public debate. As the claims of the contending parties are called into 
question, this debate opens up a space for the evidence of the present. In the 
last thirty years, not just political parties but various interest groups —
feminists, ethnic minorities, environmental activists, etc.— have joined this 
public debate. Doing so, they have laid claim not just to their versions of our 
collective future but also the remembered past that would offer resources to 
support it. The result has been a sort of democratization of remembering as 
various suppressed groups have laid claim to their own histories.  
Some have questioned this, seeing it as a radical transformation of the no-
tion of history. The French Academician, Pierre Nora, for example, sharply dis-
tinguishes remembering and history. He writes:  
 
Memory is life, borne by living societies founded in its name. It remains in perma-
nent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of 
its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, suscep-
tible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is 
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the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. (1989: 
9) 
 
It is “a representation of the past”. It “belongs to everyone and to no one, 
whence its claim to universal authority”. By contrast, “there are as many mem-
ories as there are groups”. In other words, “memory is by nature multiple and 
yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual” (Ibid.). Given this, the confla-
tion of the two undermines history understood “as a discipline that aspired to 
scientific status” (2002). 
Is such a scientific status theoretically possible? At issue, here, is not the 
responsible treatment of historical sources, which all historians share. It is the 
status of our past. Can it be made a scientific object? In particular, can we ab-
stract it from our collective life with its shifting projects and shifting focuses of 
remembering? As part of the living temporalization of a society, the past is nec-
essarily involved in the debates concerning the future. Competing projects 
bring with them, inevitably, competing accounts of the past and, hence, com-
peting interpretations of the potentialities it offers us. Yet, as we have seen, to 
isolate the past from this is to abstract it from our human reality. It is to em-
brace the ideal of the past that can, like Gradiva’s step, be made fully present. 
It is, in fact, to transfer the past to the world of external perception, the world 
where it is always now. This is the world of inanimate objects, of objects that 
do not remember, that, consequently, are always in the present. The difficulty 
with this transfer is that the objects of history are not inanimate. They are our-
selves in our temporal identity. As such, we cannot separate them from our-
selves without transforming their basic sense. The basic fact here is that re-
membering is a function of life. It is, in its very transformations, vital to its on-
going self-affirmation. To accept these transformations, while responsibly han-
dling the sources of the past, is to carry on the debate of public life in a way 
that allows such life to affirm itself. Ultimately, it signifies accepting our life in 
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